Abstract. We show that many countable support iterations of proper forcings preserve Souslin trees. We establish sufficient conditions in terms of games and we draw connections to other preservation properties. We present a proof of preservation properties in countable support iterations in the so-called Case A that does not need a division into forcings that add reals and those who do not.
Introduction
This work is related to Juhász' question [14] : "Does Ostaszewski's club principle imply the existence of a Souslin tree?" We recall the club principle (also written ♣): There is a sequence A α : α a limit ordinal < ω 1 with the following properties: For every countable limit ordinal α, A α is cofinal in α and for any uncountable X ⊆ ω 1 there are stationarily many α with A α ⊆ X. Such a sequence is called a ♣-sequence. The club principle was introduced in [15] .
Partial positive answers are known: Let M denote the ideal of meagre sets. In every model of the club principle and cov(M) > ℵ 1 by Miyamoto [5, Section 4] there are Souslin trees. Brendle showed [5, Theorem 6 ]: In every model of the club principle and cof(M) = ℵ 1 there are Souslin trees. In this paper we give examples of models satisfying the club principle, the existence of Souslin trees, cov(M) = ℵ 1 and cof(M) = ℵ 2 (i.e., neither of the sufficient conditions mentioned above holds).
Assume that we start with a ground model satisfying ♦ ω 1 and that we force with a proper countable support iteration P α , Q β : α ≤ κ, β < ω 2 of length ω 2 . For this scenario in [12] we showed: If the single step forcings are suitable forcings from [16] (with finite or countable H(n), see Section 2.1), then the final model will satisfy the club principle. Note that the assumption of the diamond in the ground model is actually not necessary, since after ω 1 iteration steps of any forcing with two incompatible conditions with countable support ♦ ω 1 holds anyway [11, Ch. 7, Theorem 8.3] and the length of our iterations is ω 2 .
Let us look at the countable support iteration of length ω 2 of Miller forcing: According to the mentioned result, after ω 1 many steps we get ♦ ω 1 and therefore a Souslin tree in the intermediate extension. Lemma 2.1. together with the results in Section 4 show that any countable support iteration of Miller forcing preserves Souslin trees. Hence after ω 2 many iteration steps there is a Souslin tree. Moreover by [12] the club principle holds. It is known that in the Miller model d = ℵ 2 (and hence cof(M) = ℵ 2 ) and cov(M) = ℵ 1 . A countable support iteration of length ω 2 of BlassShelah forcing gives another model of d = ℵ 2 and cov(M) = ℵ 1 and the club principle. Blass-Shelah forcing is not ω-Cohen preserving (see Def. 3.1) and increases the splitting number (see [3, Prop. 3.1] ). Besides these two particular examples, the main technical work in this paper is a study of the preservation of Souslin trees.
We refer the reader to [2] for the definitions of cardinal characteristics, and to [12] for reading about the the club principle. For background about properness we refer the reader to [22] and the more detailed introductions in [6, 1] . In forcing notions, q > p means that q is stronger than p. The paper is organised as follows:
In Section 1 we give some conditions on a forcing in terms of games that imply that the forcing is (T, Y, S)-preserving. A special case of (T, Y, S)-preserving is preserving the Souslinity of an ω 1 -tree.
In Section 2 we show that for some tree-creature forcings from [16] the player COM has a winning strategy in one of the games from Section 1. Hence these forcings preserve Souslin trees. Without the games, we show that some linear creature forcings from [16] are (T, Y, S)-preserving. There are non-Cohen preserving examples.
For the wider class of non-elementary proper forcings we show in Section 3 that ω-Cohen preserving for certain candidates implies (T, Y, S)-preserving.
In Section 4 we give a less general but hopefully more easily readable presentation of a result from [22, Chapter 18, §3] : If all iterands in a countable support iteration are proper and (T, Y, S)-preserving, then also the iteration is (T, Y, S)-preserving. This is a presentation of the so-called Case A in which a division in forcings that add reals and those who do not is not needed.
A sufficient condition for (T, Y, S)-preserving
We introduce two games ι (P, p), ι = 1, 2, that are games about the completeness of the notion of forcing P above p. Similar games appear in [17, 19, 18] . We let G P = {(p, p) : p ∈ P} be the standard name for a P-generic filter. If it is clear which P is meant we write just G . Definition 1.1. Let P be a notion of forcing and p ∈ P. We define the games ι (P, p), ι = 1, 2. The moves look the same for both games, and only in the winning conditions they are different.
(1) The game 1 (P, p) is played in ω rounds. In round n, player COM chooses an ℓ n ∈ ω {0} and a sequence p n,ℓ : ℓ < ℓ n of conditions p n,ℓ ∈ P and then player INC plays q n,ℓ : n < ℓ n such that p n,ℓ ≤ q n,ℓ . After ω rounds, COM wins the game iff there is q ≥ p such that for each n, {q n,ℓ : ℓ < ℓ n } is predense above q.
(2) The game 2 (P, p) is played in ω rounds that look exactly like the rounds in 1 (P, p). After ω rounds, COM wins the game iff for every infinite u ⊆ ω there is q u ≥ p such that q u (∃ ∞ n ∈ u)(∃ℓ < ℓ n )(q n,ℓ ∈ G ). Definition 1.2. For ι = 1, 2, we say P has property Pr ι and write Pr ι (P) iff for every p ∈ P, in the game ι (P, p) the player COM has a winning strategy.
We fix a suffiently large regular cardinal χ. We write H(χ) for the set of sets of hereditary cardinality less than χ, and let H(χ) = (H(χ), ∈, < * χ ) with a well-order < * χ on H(χ). Definition 1.3. Let α( * ) be an uncountable ordinal. Let S ⊆ [α( * )] ω be stationary, let ι = 1, 2, and let P be a forcing. Then Pr ι S (P) denotes the following property: For every sufficiently large χ and every countable N ≺ H(χ) with P ∈ N , and N ∩ α( * ) ∈ S, for every p ∈ P ∩ N player COM has a winning strategy in the game ι (N, P, p). The game ι (N, P, p) is defined like the ι (P, p) except that we require that every initial segment of a play is in N .
Pr
ι (P) implies Pr ι S (P) for any S, and Pr 1 (P) implies Pr 2 (P).
Lemma 1.4.
In all the games any winning strategy for COM can be modified by playing at each stage a larger number ℓ n and stronger conditions, that is, the resulting function is a winning strategy for COM as well.
Definition 1.5. Let S ⊆ [α( * )] ω be stationary. P is S-proper if for any N ≺ H(χ)) such that N ∩ α( * ) ∈ S, for any p ∈ P ∩ N there is q ≥ p that is (N, P)-generic. q is (N, P)-generic means: For any D ∈ N , if D is dense in P then q G ∩ D = ∅. Definition 1.6. (1) A forcing P is ω ω-bounding if for every P-name f for a function from ω to ω and for any p, there are g ∈ ω ω and q ≥ p, q ∈ P, such that q ∀nf (n) ≤ g(n).
(2) A forcing P is almost ω ω-bounding if for every name f for a function from ω to ω, for any A ⊆ ω and any p ∈ P there are q ≥ p and g ∈ ω ω such that q (∃ ∞ n ∈ A)(f (n) ≤ g(n)).
Lemma 1.7. (1) If Pr
1 S (P), then P is S-proper, and P is ω ω-bounding. (2) If Pr 2 S (P), then P is S-proper, and P is almost ω ω-bounding. Remark 1.8. The reverse implications do not hold: The NNR forcing from [22, Ch . IV] is a counterexample to both, as Theorem 1.17 will show.
Proof. We prove (2) . Item (1) is proved similarly. Let f be a P-name for a function from ω to ω. Fix a winning strategy st for COM in 2 (P, p). Let P, f , st ∈ N ≺ H(χ), N ∩ α( * ) ∈ S, p ∈ P ∩ N . Let τ k : k < ω be a list of the P-names in N of ordinals. In round n, INC plays such that for for every ℓ < ℓ n , q n,ℓ forces a value to f (i) for i ≤ n and a value to τ i for i < n. Let g(n) be the maximum of the values forced to f (n) by q n,ℓ , ℓ < ℓ n . Fix an infinite u ⊆ ω and let q u witness that COM wins. Then q u is N -generic: Let τ k be a P-name in N for an ordinal. Then q u forces that here are infinitely many k ′ > k, k ′ ∈ u and ℓ ∈ ω that that q k ′ ,ℓ ∈ G. This q k ′ ,ℓ decides (τ m ) m<k ′ in N and forces f (k ′ ) to be some value less than g(k ′ ). ⊣ Remark 1.9. Sacks forcing satisfies Pr 1 . COM can fix ℓ n = 2 n · ℓ n−1 and play the restrictions of q n−1,i , i < ℓ n−1 , to the members of its n-th splitting front as p n,i , i < ℓ n .
The following versions of the games that work for all starting points in a countable model simultaneously are interesting for themselves. However, 1.10 and 1.11 will not be used in the sequel so that a reader who is mainly interested in preserving Souslin trees can skip them. Definition 1.10. Let N ≺ H(χ). We define a game ι (N, P): The moves are as in ι (N, P, p). The winning conditions read for ι = 1: For every p ∈ P∩N there is a q ≥ p such that for all but finitely many n, {q n,ℓ : ℓ < ℓ n } is predense above q. For ι = 2: For every p ∈ P ∩ N and infinite u there is a q u ≥ p as in 2 (P, p). Lemma 1.11. If Pr ι S (P) and N ∩ α( * ) ∈ S, then COM has a winning strategy in ι (N, P).
Proof. Let N ∩ P = {p j : j < ω}. Let st j be a strategy for COM in ι (N, P, p j ).
Let in the n-th move strategy st j tell COM to choose p j,n = p j,n,ℓ : ℓ < ℓ j,n . Then COM moves in ι (N, P) by letting ℓ n = j≤n ℓ j,n−j and p n = p 0,n ⌢ . . . ⌢ p j,n−j ⌢ . . . ⌢ p n,n−n . ⊣ Now we describe Souslin trees. Definition 1.12.
(1) An ω 1 -tree is a tree of size ω 1 with at most countable levels and height ω 1 .
(2) Let (T, < T ) be a tree. We let T < T s = {t ∈ T : t < s}, and let T ≤ T s , T > T s be defined analogously.
(3) Let (T, < T ) be a tree. Then we write T α for {s ∈ T : (T < T s , < T ) ∼ = α} and call T α the α-th level of T .
(4) Moreover, we require that the trees are normal i.e., for every node t on level α < ω 1 for every ω 1 > β > α there are t ′′ = t ′ > T t on level β. Definition 1.13. A Souslin tree is an ω 1 tree that has no uncountable chains and no uncountable antichains.
A notion of forcing P preserves any Souslin tree if it preserves any normal Souslin tree. This is seen as follows: Let T be a Souslin tree. We let A = {t ∈ T : T ≥ T t is at most countable and t is minimal with the property}. Since T is a Souslin tree, A is at most countable. We let T ′ = T A. T ′ is a Souslin tree in V P iff T is a Souslin tree in V P .
Let T be a normal ω 1 -tree. Let b be a cofinal branch. By normality, there are cofinally many α < ω 1 such that there are t α ∈ b ∩ T α and t ′ α > T t α , t ′ α ∈ b. Then these t ′ α form an antichain. So T is Souslin iff it does not have any uncountable antichain. Definition 1.14. We conceive a normal ω 1 -tree (T, < T ) without cofinal branches as a forcing notion. A stronger condition is higher up in the tree.
We say T is (Y, S)-proper iff Y ⊆ T and for every sufficiently large χ for every countable N ≺ H(χ) with {T, S} ⊂ N and
The definition gets stronger the larger Y is. For characterising Souslin trees Y is taken to be a union of stationarily many level of the tree. Another application is gotten by taking Y (δ) = ∅ for stationarily many δ. The following known lemma, which is [22, Claim 3.9 B], characterises normal Souslin trees. Lemma 1.15. Let (T, < T ) be a normal ω 1 -tree. The following are equivalent:
(1) T is Souslin. Proof.
(1) implies (2): Let T be a Souslin tree and let N ≺ H(χ) with T ∈ N , N ∈ S. Let δ = N ∩ ω 1 ∈ W . We show that every node t on level δ is (N, T )-generic: Let I ∈ N be dense in T . Now let in N , I ′ ⊂ I be a maximal antichain in T . N |= "I ′ is countable", so I ′ ⊆ N . Now {s ∈ T : (∃r ∈ I ′ )(r ≤ T s)} ∩ {s ∈ T : s < T t} = ∅, since otherwise I ′ ∪ {t} is an antichain, in contradiction to the fact that by N ≺ H(χ) the set I ′ ∈ N is also a maximal antichain in T in the sense of H(χ) and in the sense of V.
(3) implies (1). We fix S and Y as in (3) . We consider the case that A ⊆ T is an uncountable maximal antichain and take N ≺ H(χ) with T, A ∈ N , N ∈ S, δ = N ∩ ω 1 ∈ W = {δ ∈ ω 1 : Y (δ) = T δ }. Then A is dense in T in N . However, since A is uncountable, there is t ′ ∈ A N . Let t = t ′ ↾ δ ∈ T δ . The node t is incompatible with every a ∈ A ∩ N , so t cannot lie above an a ∈ A ∩ N , so T < T t is not (N, T )-generic. ⊣ Definition 1.16. We say P is (T, Y, S)-preserving iff the following holds: Let S ⊆ ω 1 be stationary. There is x ∈ H(χ), for every countable N ≺ H(χ) with {x, Y, T, P, S} ⊆ N and p ∈ P ∩ N : if N ∩ ω 1 = δ, N ∩ ω 1 ∈ S, and for every t ∈ Y (δ), {s : s < T t} is (N, T )-generic, then there is q ≥ P p such that q is (N, P)-generic and
We remark that the quantifier "for every countable N ≺ H(χ) with {x, Y, T, P, S} ⊆ N and p ∈ P ∩ N " can be weakened and that the particular choice of x ∈ H(χ) is not essential, see [1, Theorem 2.13] In Section 4 we show that "T is (Y, S)-proper" is preserved by countable support iterations of proper iterands if each iterand preserves it. Since we are mainly interested in countable support iterations (because of the club principle), we can focus onto the question: Which iterands preserve "T is (Y, S)-proper"?
A sufficient criterion is given by Pr 2 S (P). Theorem 1.17. Assume α( * ) = ω 1 and S ⊆ ω 1 is stationary. Let T be an ω 1 -tree and Y ⊆ T . If Pr 2 S (P), then P is (T, Y, S)-preserving. Proof. Assume N ≺ H(χ), N ∩ ω 1 ∈ S, N ∩ ω 1 = δ, and P ∈ N , p ∈ N ∩ P, and assume for every t ∈ Y (δ), {s : s < T t} is (N, P, p)-generic. Let x = st for a winning strategy st for player COM in 2 (N, P, p). We show that there is a q as required in the previous definition.
Let Y = {t δ k : k < γ δ , δ ∈ W } for suitable γ δ ≤ ω. Let {Ĩ n : n ∈ ω} list the P-names of open dense sets in the forcing T that are in N and let {J n : n ∈ ω} list the open dense sets in P in N . Now we take a play p n , q n : n ∈ ω in which COM plays according to st. INC plays in every round n in every i < ℓ n the condition q n,i so strong that q n,i ∈ r<n J r and such that for every k < n there is t i,n,k < T t δ k such that
Why can INC play like this? Given i < ℓ n and a starting point q ′ , for k < n he can strengthen q n,i ≥ q ′ so that q n,i P t i,n,k ∈ k ′ <n Ĩ k ′ for a suitable t i,n,k < T t δ k . Since {s : s < T t δ k } is (N, T )-generic, there is such a t i,n,k < T t δ k , t i,n,k ∈ J . Now he repeats this for each k < n. Since k ′ <n Ĩ k ′ is (forced by the weakest conditions to be) open dense in the forcing T , the set J = {s ∈ T ∩ N : q P s ∈ k ′ <n Ĩ k ′ } is dense in T in the ground model (before forcing with P).
COM wins the play because he played according to the strategy. So for every u, in particular for u = ω, there is q u ≥ p such that
Let k ∈ ω and q ′ ≥ q u be given. Then there is q ′′ ≥ q ′ and n ≥ k such that q ′′ n ∈ u. So there is i < ℓ n , q ′′ q n,i ∈ G P and hence
Now we unfreeze k and combine the equations (1.1) and (1.2) and thus get
From q n,i ∈ r<n J r we also get that q u is (N, P)-generic. ⊣ Corollary 1.18. If T is a Souslin tree, S is stationary, and P is a notion of forcing with Pr 2 S (P), then T is Souslin in V P .
Proof. We let Y = {T δ : δ ∈ S}. By Lemma 1.15 we have: T is (Y, S)-proper iff it is a Souslin tree. Now Theorem 1.17 shows the preservation of "T is (Y, S)-proper". ⊣ Historical remarks: Our notion of S-properness this is called ({S}, ∅, ∅)-properness in [22, Def. IV, 2.2.]. The notions of ω ω-bounding and almost ω ω-bounding appeared in [21] . A general study of preservation of these and related properties in iterations is in [22, Ch. VI] . A even more extensive study of preservation properties is carried out in Chapter XVIII of [22] . In [22, XVIII 3. 9 D] a variant of our definition of (T, Y, S)-preserving is mentioned.
Many creature forcings P preserve Souslin trees
We begin this section with a proof that Miller forcing hat Pr 2 . Then we look at other creature forcings. We give a short self-contained introduction to creatures in general. In the third subsection we consider tree creatures and give sufficient conditions for Pr 1 and Pr 2 . In the fourth subsection we are concerned with linear creatures. For these forcings we have not found strategies in our games. However, some forcings of this kind preserve Souslin trees for other reasons. Miller forcing answers our question about the consistency of the club principle together with the existence of a Souslin tree and cov(M) = ℵ 1 and cof(M) = ℵ 2 , since it is well-known [4, 24, 20] The Miller conditions such that each splitting node has infinitely many immediate successors are dense in the Miller order. From now on we work only with such conditions. For r ∈ P let rt(r) be the trunk, that is the shortest η such that succ r (η) = {η ⌢ n : η ⌢ n ∈ r} is infinite.
Theorem 2.1. Miller P forcing has Pr 2 (P).
Proof. We assume that all moves of both players in the game 2 (P, p) below have infinite splitting in each splitting node.
We describe a strategy st for COM in 2 (P, p). On the side after the nth move COM chooses a finite set of nodes v n that are among the splitting nodes of INC's previously chosen conditions. COM play so that the sequence p n , q n , v n : n ∈ ω has the following properties:
(1) For n ≥ 1, given v n−1 , COM chooses ℓ n = |v n−1 | and for η ∈ v n−1 , η = rt(q n ′ ,ℓ ) for some n ′ < n, ℓ < ℓ n ′ he lets
Since the q n ′ ,ℓ is a Miller condition and each η ∈ v n−1 is a splitting node of q n ′ ,ℓ for some n ′ < n and ℓ < ℓ n ′ and v n−1 is finite, for each
and the round is finished. Indeed ℓ n+1 = 2ℓ n and ℓ 0 = 1, but this is not important.
The strategy st is a winning strategy for COM: Let u ⊆ ω be infinite. By induction on n ∈ u we choose s n ⊆ v n v n−1 . If n = min(u), then s n ⊆ v n v n−1 is a singleton. For n > min(u), let
Lastly we let
By definition, q u is a tree. It is a Miller tree, since for every n ∈ u, for every η ∈ s n , η is a splitting node in q u since η = rt(q n,ℓ ) ∈ v n v n−1 . We show that for this pair (n, ℓ), an infinite subset of succ q n,ℓ (η) is a subset of succ qu (η): For any k > n and there is ν η ⌢ m(η, k),
Moreover q u P (∃ ∞ n ∈ u)(∃ℓ < ℓ n )(q n,ℓ ∈ G P ): Suppose that not. Let r ≥ P q u be a Miller condition such that r ∀n ∈ u(n ≥ k → (∀ℓ < ℓ k )(q k,ℓ ∈ G P ). By strengthening r, we may assume that rt(r) ∈ s n for some n ≥ k, so r ≥ q n,ℓ for some ℓ < ℓ n . This is a contradiction. ⊣
The properties Pr 1 and Pr 2 hold for tree-creature forcings with the lim norm or the lim-sup norm. We explain this now.
2.2.
Forcings with (tree) creatures. Now we give more examples. In order to describe the relevant properties we give a brief review of the definitions to forcings with creatures. This concept is explained in the book [16] , and it is divided into two main streams: one kind of creature forcing is forcing with creatures such that the conditions are written in an ω-sequence like Blass-Shelah forcing [3] . Another example of a forcing with ω-sequences of creatures is the (historically first) creature forcing in [21] that forces b < s. The other stream is forcing with tree creatures. For historical reasons the first kind is often just called "creature forcing" and the second kind is called "tree creature forcing". In this subsection we give a very short introduction to the main concepts. Let H : ω → H(ω 1 ) be a function such that (∀n)(| H(n)| ≥ 2 ∧ 0 ∈ H(n)). 
is a non-empty subset of 
(b) We write Σ(r) for Σ({r}). r ∈ Σ(r) for each r ∈ K and Σ(∅) = ∅.
(2) In the situation described above (K, Σ) is called a weak creating pair.
Definition 2.5. Let (K, Σ) be a weak creating pair for H.
(1) For a weak creature t ∈ K we define its basis with respect to (K, Σ) as
(2) For w ∈ m<ω i<m H(i) and S ∈ [K] ≤ω we define the set pos(w, S) of possible extensions of w from the point of view of S as
pos(w, S) ={u : there are m ∈ ω and disjoint sets S i for i < m,
and a sequence 0 < ℓ 1 < · · · < ℓ m−1 < lg(u)such that u ↾ ℓ 1 ∈ pos * (w, S 0 )and
2.3. Tree creatures. From now on we specialise on tree creatures. They have the special property that val[t] has just one root.
Definition 2.6. (1) A quasi tree (T, ⊳ T ) is a set of finite sequences, ordered by initial segment, and there is a ⊳ T smallest element rt(T ), called the root of T .
(2) A quasi tree is called a tree if it is closed under initial segments. If T is a quasi tree we denote its closure under initial segments by dcl(T ).
(This is the smallest tree containing T .) (3) We define the set of immediate successors of η in T , the restriction of T to η, the splitting points of T and the maximal points of T by
(4) The n-th level of T is T n = {η ∈ T : η has n ⊳ T -predecessors}.
(5) A branch of T is a maximal subset of T that is linearly ordered by ⊳ T . The set of infinite branches through T is lim(T ) = {η : η is an ω-sequence and
A quasi tree is well-founded if there are no infinite branches through it.
(6) A subset F of a quasi tree T is called a front of T if every infinite branch of T and every finite branch of T passes through this set, and the set consists of ⊳ T -incomparable elements.
) is a singleton {η} and no two distinct elements of range(val[t]) are ⊳-comparable (so also not compatible as finite partial functions since every η ∈ range(val[t]) has as a domain some n ∈ ω).
is the family of all tree creatures for H. 
We write Σ(
So for a tree creating pair, if t ∈ TCR η [H], then basis(t) = {η} and pos * (η, {t}) = succ t (η) = range(val[t]). We write only pos * (t) for pos * (η, {t}).
The next definition introduces requirements on the norms of the creatures in a condition. We focus on the limsup condition and the lim condition. To speak in a uniform way about both variants, we introduce a parameter e, and e = 0 stands for the limsup case, and e = 1 stands for the lim case.
Definition 2.8. Let (K, Σ) be a tree-creating pair for H, such that there are t ∈ TCR η [H] ∩ K of arbitrary high norm.
(1) We define the forcing notion Q tree e (K, Σ) for e = 0, 1 by letting p = t η : η ∈ T ∈ Q tree e (K, Σ):
is a non-empty quasi tree with max(T ) = ∅, and
, and (c) in the lim case (e = 1) we require for η ∈ lim(T ),
In the limsup case (e = 0) we require for η ∈ lim(T ) the sequence
We define the forcing order ≤=≤ Q tree
The prominent real added by Q tree e (K, Σ), e = 0, 1, is W with
Usually the conditions on the norm imply that W is forced to be not in V.
Definition 2.9. Let (K, Σ) be a tree-creating pair p ∈ Q tree e (K, Σ), e = 0, 1. A set A ⊆ T p is called an e-thick antichain if it is an antichain in (T p , ⊳) and for every condition q ≥ p the intersection A ∩ dcl(T q ) is not empty. is a partial order. Each e-thick antichain A in T p gives a maximal antichain {p [η] : η ∈ A} in Q tree e above p. Every front of T p is an e-thick antichain in T p .
(2) We define
is a front of T p and an e-thick antichain of T p for e = 0, 1.
Proof. See [16, Prop. 1.3.7] . Now the forcings notions with the normed trees let us define strengthenings of the forcing order ≤ that are natural candidates for Axiom A (a definition can be found, e.g., in [2, Def. 7.1.1]).
Definition 2.11. Let (K, Σ) be a tree-creating pair and let p, q ∈ Q tree 0 (K, Σ).
(1) For the limsup case, we define ≤ 0 n for n < ω by
and ν ∈ T p and ν η then ν ∈ T q and t
(2) For the lim case we define ≤ 1 n for n < ω by
Note that t p ν = t q ν means also that the immediate successors of ν in p coincide with the immediate successors of ν in q.
Proposition 2.12. Suppose that e = 0, 1, p n ∈ Q tree e (K, Σ) and for n ∈ ω, p n ≤ e n+1 p n+1 . Then the limit condition p = lim n→ω p n is defined by T p = n<ω T pn and for η ∈ n<ω T pn we take the creature t p η = n∈ω t pn η (note that this is actually a finite intersection since the descending sequence t pn η , n ∈ ω eventually becomes constant) into p. Then p ∈ Q tree e (K, Σ) and p ≥ e n+1 p n for each n. Proposition 2.13. Let p ∈ Q tree e (K, Σ), n < ω, and let
= q η for η ∈ A and if ν ∈ T p is such that there is no η ∈ A with η ν then ν ∈ T q and t
Since we repeatedly use the construction from Proposition 2.13 in a reordered setting for the lim case, we name it: Definition 2.14. We call the q constructed from p, A and q η , η ∈ A, as in the previous proposition:
When we use this expression we assume that the conditions on p, A, q η , η ∈ A, as given in the proposition are fulfilled.
Definition 2.15. A tree-creating pair (K, Σ) is t-omittory if for each system s ν : ν ∈T such that dcl(T ) is a well-founded tree and rt(s ν ) = ν and pos * (s ν ) = succT (s ν ) for ν ∈T max(T ) and for every ν 0 ∈T such that
Note that t-omittoriness implies that the domain of Σ contains (s ν : ν ∈ T ) for all well-founded subtreesT . A suitable equivalent formulation of Miller forcing is t-omittory. Now there is an important construction we want to recall and use in the proofs of Lemma 2.17 and of Prop. 2.18 and of Theorem 2.19.
Lemma 2.16. Let e = 0, 1 and let (K, Σ) be t-omittory. If p ≤ q then there is r ∈ Q tree e (K, Σ) such that p ≤ e 0 r and dcl(T r ) ⊆ dcl(T q ) and t r ν = t q ν for ν ∈ T r {rt(T r )} and rt(q) ∈ dcl(T r ) and nor(t r rt(r) ) ≥ nor(t q rt(q) ) − 1. Proof. We let η = rt(q) and let T * be a well founded quasi tree such that (∀ν ∈ T * )(succ T * (ν) = pos * (t p ν )) and rt(T * ) = η and t
T − is a well-founded quasi tree and we may apply t-omitting to t
, we repeatedly use Lemma 2.16 to change it into a stronger condition in Q tree 1 (K, Σ). ⊣ Proposition 2.18.
(1) Suppose that (K, Σ) is a finitary t-omittory treecreating pair. Then player COM has a winning strategy in 1 (Q tree 1 (K, Σ), p). (2) Suppose that (K, Σ) is a finitary creating pair that is t-omittory. Then player COM has as winning strategy in 1 (Q tree 0 (K, Σ), p). Proof. By Lemma 2.17 we need to prove only (2). We describe a strategy st for COM in 1 (P, p). The play will be p n , q n , : n ∈ ω . This time we let v n = {rt(q n,ℓ ) : ℓ < ℓ n }. COM plays so that the play has the following properties:
(1) v n v n−1 is a subset of some nodes η n,ℓ of q n,ℓ , ℓ < ℓ n . In contrast to the proof of Theorem 2.1, now v m ∩ v n = ∅ and we only need to look at the q n,ℓ from the previous round.
(2) COM lets for η ∈ v n−1 , η = η n ℓ = rt(q n−1,ℓ ) for some ℓ < ℓ n−1 ,
Since the q n−1,ℓ , ℓ < ℓ n−1 , are tree conditions with pairwise incomparable roots and each η ∈ v n is a node of q ′ n−1,ℓ for some ℓ < ℓ n−1 and v n−1 is finite, for each η ∈ v n−1 , (η, n) is defined. Now COM chooses for each η ∈ v n−1 , with η = rt(q n−1,ℓ ), for each ζ ∈ F (η, n), and for each ρ ∈ range(val[t
COM lets ℓ be the sum of these finite cardinalities of the fronts F (n, η) for all η ∈ v n−1 , of all ρ's for all ζ ∈ F (n, η) and rearranges his move as
Now we prove Pr 1 (P). We let
By definition, q is a quasi tree. It is a condition since we have by Prop. 2.13 that there is a sequence q n : n < ω such that q 0 = q, q n+1 = q n ↾ {η :
n,ℓ . We consider q ′ ≥ q and assume q ′ forces that {q n,ℓ : ℓ < ℓ n } is not dense. By the tree omittoriness, we can find q ′ n ≥ q ′ , q n as in Lemma 2.16 such that pos(t
Suppose that m<ω H(m) is countable and (K, Σ) is a tree creating pair for H that is t-omittory. Then the forcing COM has a winning strategy in 2 (Q tree 0 (K, Σ), p). Proof. We show that there is a strategy for COM in 2 (P, p). This time he plays a tuple as a side move that is more complex than the one in Theorem 2.1. We let F (n, η) and val[t q n−1,ℓ ζ ] be as in the proof of Proposition 2.18. Now both of them are infinite. So in order to visit them all, we organise the induction so that we at stage n we visit all the finitely many previous stages again and add just one node ζ(n, η) of each previous F (n ′ , η), n ′ < n, η = η n ℓ = rt(q n ′ ,ℓ ′ ) ∈ v n for a specific n ′ < n and ℓ ′ < ℓ n ′ , and we add one node ρ(n, η) of val[t q n ′ ,ℓ ′ ζ(n,η) ]. Again ℓ n = 2 n . Both kinds of tasks, the F (n ′ , η) and the val[t q n,ℓ ′ ζ(n,η) ] will now appear as the fronts I x,η in the construction below.
We describe a strategy st for COM in 2 (P, p). First, let ̺ * k : k < ω list dcl(T p ). We say x = (v x , p x , I x ) is an expanded state in 2 (P, p) if x consists of (a) v = v x a finite, non-empty set of splitting nodes of p with sufficiently high norm that has a root, rt
{η} is a front in p x,η , it can be taken the direct successors of η in dcl(T px,η ),
For two expanded states x, y, we say
. COM chooses on the side after the n-th move x n ≥ x n−1 such the play p n , q n , x n : n ∈ ω has the following properties:
In the n-th move COM first lets for η ∈ v x n−1 ,
COM defines x n with the following properties:
Now we prove Pr 2 (P). Let p n , q n , x n : n < ω be a play in which COM uses st and let u ⊆ ω be infinite. We show how to define q u .
For m 1 < m 2 < ω we define a function f m 1 ,m 2 as follows
Next we choose w u,n by induction on n ∈ u such that w u,n ⊆ v xn . Case 1: n = min(u). We let η ∈ v xn be ⊳-maximal and let w u,n = {η}. Case 2: n ∈ u, n > min(u). m = max(u ∩ n),
We define q u ∈ P by induction on n such that by T qu ⊆ dcl( m∈u w u,m ). For ζ ∈ T qu we let f m,n (ν) = ζ and set pos(t . Note that dcl( m∈u w u,m ) is a tree without maxima since (∀m < n)(m, n ∈ u → (∀η ∈ w u,m )(∃ν ∈ I xm,η )(∃̺ ∈ w u,n )(ρ = f (ν))). We show:
. Now we use t-omittoriness. By strengthening r according to Lemma 2.16, we may assume that rt(r) ∈ w u,n for some n ≥ k, so, by our construction of q u , r ≥ q * ,n η for some η ∈ w u,n . This is a contradiction. ⊣ Definition 2.20. Let (K, Σ) be a tree-creating pair for H, k < ω.
(1) A tree creature t ∈ K is called k-big if nor[t] > 1 and for every function
Although t-omittoriness does not literally imply bigness, it gives an analogue of bigness if the function h from Definition 2.20(1) colours the second but highest level of a tree of possibilities, since this level corresponds to the top level of the treeT in the definition of t-omittory. So every treecreature forcing construction performed with bigness can also be done with t-omittoriness. This sheds some light on the the conditions in [ Definition 2.21. Suppose that (K, Σ) is a weak creating pair for H and C(nor) is a property of ω-sequences of weak creatures from K (i.e., C(nor) is a subset of K ω ). We define the forcing notion Q C(nor) (K, Σ). Conditions are pairs (w, T ) such that for some k 0 < ω, (a) w ∈ i<k 0 H(i).
(ii) w ∈ basis(t i ) for some i < ω, and for each finite set I 0 ⊆ ω and u ∈ pos(w, {t i : i ∈ I 0 }) there is i ∈ ω (max(I 0 ) + 1) such that u ∈ basis(t i ).
(c) the sequence t i : i < ω satisfies the conditions C(nor). The order is given by (w 1 , T 1 ) ≤ (w 2 , T 2 ) if and only if for some disjoint sets S 0 , S 1 , . . . ⊆ ω we have w 2 ∈ pos(w 1 , {t 1 ℓ : ℓ ∈ S 0 }) and t 2 i ∈ Σ({t 1 ℓ : ℓ ∈ S i+1 }) for each i < ω where T i = t i i : i < ω . If p = (w, T ) we let w p = w and T p = T and if T p = t i : i < ω then we let t p i = t i . We may write (w, t 0 , t 1 . . . ) instead of (w, T ) when T = t i : i < ω . The forcing notions corresponding to the above properties for a weak creating pair (K, Σ) will be denoted by Q s∞ (K, Σ), Q ∞ (K, Σ), Q w∞ (K, Σ).
Adding more properties to a weak creature gives an H-creature: Definition 2.25. Let (K, Σ) be a creating pair and C(nor) be a property of ω-sequences of creatures. The forcing notion Q * C(nor) (K, Σ) is a suborder of Q C(nor) (K, Σ) consisting of these conditions (w, t 0 , t 1 , . . . ) for which additionally ∀i ∈ ω, m t i up = m t i+1
dn . Definition 2.26. Let (K, Σ) be a weak creating pair for H. For every (t 0 , . . . , t n−1 ) sequence of (K, Proof. Assume that χ ≥ 2 2 ω and N ≺ H(χ) is countable and that P ∈ N ,
We show that there is q ≥ p that is (N, P)-generic and such that for every t ∈ Y (δ), q T < T t is (N [G P ], T )-generic. Now we use the Axiom A structure: We enumerate all the P-names Ĩ ∈ N for dense sets in T as {Ĩ n : n < ω}, all the J ∈ N that are dense in P as {J n : n < ω} and all the t ∈ Y (δ) a {t n : n < ω}. We choose p n by induction on n ∈ [n * , ω) such that (a) p n ∈ P ∩ N , 
There is no problem in carrying this induction as P is finitary and omittory.
In the end we let
By (f), p ω is (N, P)-generic. Now we strengthen p ω once more to get a condition p ω+1 ≥ p ω that forces that every
This strengthening is carried out as follows: Now for n < ω we let C n = pos(η pω , c pω 0 , . . . , c pω n−1 ). So C = n<ω C n is a tree. We colour this tree in two colours: c : C → {yes, "no"} for ν ∈ C, c(ν) = "yes", iff for some s < T t, ( * ) n,ν,pω,pω[ν],s and no otherwise. If n ≤ n 1 < n 2 and ν i ∈ C n i and ν 1 ⊳ ν 2 and c(ν 1 ) = yes, then c(ν 2 ) = yes, since p
ω . Now by [16, Theorem 2.2.6] we have the following consequence of omittorybig: There is p ω+1 ≥ 0 p ω such that the following holds: If ν i ∈ C n i , n 1 < n 2 , and ν i ∈ {rt(q) : p ω+1 ≤ q} and ν 1 ⊳ ν 2 then c(ν 1 ) = c(ν 2 ).
We check that the uniform colour is "yes". Suppose for a contradiction that (∀ν * ⊲ η p ω+1 )(c(ν * ) = no). We let p ω+2 = (ν * , c
for a suitable m * with m * ∈ C. So there are s < t m * and q ≥ p ω+2 with q s ∈ k<m * I k . As I k , k < m * , are dense subsets of (T, < T ) that have names in N there is such a pair (s, q). Now c(rt(q)) = yes. So the uniform colour cannot be "no". ⊣
We recall Blass-Shelah forcing in order to see that it fulfils the conditions of the previous theorem. Definition 2.30. We define a depth function on {A ⊆ [ω] <ω : 2 ≤ |A| < ω} as follows: dp(A) ≥ 0, always, dp(A) ≥ 1, if A = ∅, dp(A) ≥ n + 2, if for every set X ⊆ ω one of the following conditions holds dp({a ∈ A : a ⊆ X}) ≥ n + 1, or dp({a ∈ A : a ⊆ ω X}) ≥ n + 1. 
Suppose t 0 , . . . , t n in K are such that m t i+1 dn = m t i up for i < n. Then s ∈ Σ(t 0 , . . . , t n ) iff s ∈ K and m s dn = m t 0 dn and m s up = m tn up and for every u, v ∈ val(s) for every i ≤ n, v ↾ m
Blass-Shelah forcing is finitary, omittory and omittory-big. So by Theorem 2.29 it is (T, Y, S)-preserving.
There is a parallel result without the property "omittory" but with strong enough bigness and halving. . Now for such a sequence k and function i we require:
there is c ∈ Σ(c , c) is constant, (δ) (halving with gluing) if p ∈ P, m( * ) < ω then we can find q ∈ P with the following properties -p ≤ q, 
Proof. Assume that χ ≥ 2 2 ω and N ≺ H(χ) is countable and that
We show that there is q ≥ p that is (N, P)-generic and such that for every
We enumerate all pairs (Ĩ , t) of P-names Ĩ ∈ N for dense sets in T and t ∈ Y (δ) as {(Ĩ n , t n ) : n < ω}, all the J ∈ N that are dense in P as {J n : n < ω}, each object appearing infinitely often in each enumeration.
We choose (p n , m n ) by induction on n ∈ ω such that (a) p n ∈ P ∩ N , and by (h) and (i), q fulfils the norm conditions and hence q ∈ P, and obviously q ≥ p. So suppose that p n and m n have been defined we are to define p n+1 . Let i n = i(c pn mn ) and let {g ℓ : ℓ < ℓ n } list pos(f pn , c pn 0 , . . . , c pn mn−1 ). By the conditions on P, we have ℓ n ≤ k i . Now we choose p n,ℓ by induction on ℓ < ℓ n such that ,ℓ such that q (∃t ∈ T )(t < t n ∧ t ∈ J n ) then c It is easy to carry on the induction. In the end we let p n+1 = p n,ℓn . Now we have to show that for each I and each (t, J ) (that appear under infinitely many indices) after finitely many of these n where e.g. I n = I, in items (f) and (g) the first alternative will be applied. This is because of the strong version of bigness. We colour pos(c p , c , their uniform colour is the same, and for most of the most of the next level and so on. So we get back to the root. Its colour is at some time n the colour 1, since otherwise we succeed in constructing the fusion p ω that has no extension in I or no extension in {r ∈ P : r (∃t ′ < t)(t ′ ∈ J )}, so J * = {s ∈ T : s ≤ t ∨ p ω s ∈ J } is dense in T and witnessing that T is not (S, Y ) proper. In any case this is a contradiction. So we get c ′ mn with large norm and colour 1 and are done. There are ℓ n substeps and in each step we lose maximally 
A sufficient condition for (T, Y, S)-preserving for nep forcings
The property of preserving Cohen generic reals over countable elementary submodels proved to be a useful property of forcings. Preserving Cohen reals is slightly stronger than preserving non-meager sets (see [16, Section 3.2] ). Preserving Cohen reals is preserved in countable support iterations [22, Ch. XVIII, 3.10] . In this section we show that a relative of this property, namely "P preserves ω Cohen reals over countable elementary submodels and over certain transitive models called candidates", guarantees that P preserves Souslin trees. The candidates will replace the elementary N ≺ H(χ). When a forcing notion P has also for these non-elementary countable models suitable generic conditions then P is called "nep" -non-elementary proper. There are many versions of this definition: We can specify which candidates are considered and which conditions are imposed on genericity. A standard reference to non-elementary proper forcing is [23] .
Let N ≺ H(χ). x ∈ ω ω is called Cohen over N , if for every comeager G δ -set C ⊆ ω ω with code in N , x ∈ C. For Borel codes see [8, Definition 3.1.
(1) Let P be a proper forcing notion. We say P is ω-Cohen preserving iff the following holds: For every N ≺ H(χ) such that P ∈ N , for every p ∈ P ∩ N for every {x n : n ∈ ω} such that every x n is a Cohen real over N , there is an (N, P)-generic condition q ≥ p such that
(2) P is Cohen preserving iff the above holds for just one Cohen real.
By [22, Ch. XVIII, 3.10] also ω-Cohen preserving is preserved in countable support iterations. Cohen forcing itself is Cohen preserving, whereas random forcing is not, since the ground model reals are a meager set in the extension. For creature forcings [16, Ch. 3] gives some structural properties on the building blocks of the forcing that imply Cohen preserving.
The notion "nep" -non-elementary proper -was introduced and investigated in [23] and it is actually a reach family of notions with many parameters. We give a short introduction to our instance of nep. Our presentation is a compromise between at least covering all the creature forcings from [16] and many technicalities. Explanations and useful work with nep forcings can also be found in [10] .
In one respect we introduce more technique than needed for the creature forcings from [16] : We like to allow a parameter B with domain |B| ⊆ H(ω 1 ) and countable signature.
Why are we so interested in allowing definitions with parameters B? In the light of the theorem in this section, an interesting question is to consider to which extent forcings specialising Aronszajn trees (by finite approximations, by countable approximation as in [13] or by uncountable conditions as in the NNR forcing from [22, Ch. V, §6]) are nep. Here are some partial answers:
In all ground models in which then NNR does not add reals it is ω-Cohen preserving. However, as our Theorem 3.11 shows, NNR is not ω-Cohen preserving in other models M [G], where G collapses ω 1 of M or it is not nep in the strong sense required in the theorem. The NNR forcings are defined with Aronszajn trees as parameters in the definition. An Aronszajn with its tree order tree can be written as a subset of H(ω 1 ) and so still is a parameter allowed in size in the definitions of nep we give.
The forcings from [13] add a real that makes the ground model meager (this is not yet published work by Mildenberger and Shelah), and hence they are not Cohen preserving.
Definition 3.2. (1) A fragment ZFC
* is an L(∈)-theory extending ZC − , ZFC without replacement and without the power set axiom.
(2) Let K be a class of notions of forcing. We say ZFC * is K-good, if P is a forcing notion in K and ω (|P|) exists then the forcing P preserves ZFC * .
Now let T be a fragment of ZFC and K be a definable class of forcing notions or a set of forcings. Then by using the definability of P for P ∈ K [11, Ch. VII, §4] and adding successively the requirements P ϕ for ϕ in the previous stage we get a fragment T 1 ⊇ T that M |= T 1 ensures M [G P ] |= T . Now we iterate and take the union. This need not be a finite fragment anymore. So in practice, in order to get consistency relative to ZFC we take ZFC * = ZC − . Then for every uncountable regular κ, (H(κ), ∈) |= ZFC * . Now if no forcing in K collapses κ to ω or to a singular cardinal, ZFC * is K-good.
We fix λ = (2 |H(ω 1 )| ) + , χ = |H(λ)| ++ the set K = {Levy(ℵ 0 , λ) : λ regular uncountable cardinal, λ < χ} of notions of forcing. For every sufficiently large regular χ, H(χ) |= ZFC * .
We assume that the forcing P is defined by formulas ϕ 0 (x) and ϕ 1 (x, y) that describe x ∈ P and x ≤ P y. The formulas are in a countable language τ ⊂ H(ω) and use a parameter B ⊆ H(ω 1 ). We letφ = (ϕ 0 , ϕ 1 ) for the description of P and ≤ P . In the stronger form of nep that is called "explicit nep" we haveφ = (ϕ 0 , ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 ) with ϕ 0 and ϕ 1 in the same roles, whereas the additional first order formula ϕ 2 describes predense sets. This is a simplification, since we say transitive. The evaluation of P over countable transitive models shall give relevant information about its forcing behaviour in V. Hence it is natural to require P = M a candidate P M , where P M = ϕ M 0 . From the requirement that ϕ 0 is upwards absolute we get P M = P ∩ M . Then only P ⊆ H(ω 1 ) can fulfil the natural requirement. Fortunately many well-known useful forcings with conditions of size ω have P ⊆ H(ω 1 ). However already iterations of small iterands (i.e., with names in H(ω 1 )) of lengths ≥ ω 2 are not ⊆ H(ω 1 ) anymore. As a technical means to handle this situation one can use ord-hc candidates. M |= ZFC * instead of transitive models. We refer the reader to [23] and [9] , and we will work here only with transitive models.
In the next section, we show that (T, Y, S)-preserving is an iterable property. So it is enough to give a sufficient criterion for (T, Y, S)-preserving just for one nep iterand. Iterands usually are small and we do not lose any of the creature forcings. (a) ϕ 0 defines the set of elements of P and ϕ 0 is upwards absolute from candidates to V, in V and in all (φ, B, ZFC * )-candidates, (b) ϕ 1 defines the quasi ordering ≤ P in V and in every (φ, B, ZFC * )-candidate, ϕ 1 is upwards absolute from candidates to V, in V and in all (φ, B, ZFC * )-candidates,
We isolate a property:
In the following we show that ♥ follows from quite natural strengthenings of the notion of non-elementary properness. Many well-known forcings are non-elementary proper in one of these strong variants.
Definition 3.7. We add the adverb "explicitly", so say "(φ, B, ZFC * ) is called a (φ, B, ZFC * )-definition of an K-explicitly nep forcing" ifφ = ϕ 0 , ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 and (ϕ 0 , ϕ 1 ) are as in Definition 3.6 and additionally (b) + We assume ϕ 2 is an (ω + 1)-place relation that is upward absolute from (φ, , B, ZFC * )-candidates. ϕ 2 (p i : i ≤ ω) says {p i : i ≤ ω} ⊆ P and {p i : i < ω} is a predense antichain above p ω not just in V but in every (φ, B, ZFC * )-candidate which satisfies ϕ 2 (p i : i ≤ ω). In this situation we say {p i : i < ω} is explicitly predense above p ω .
(c) + We add to (c) in the definition of nep: There is q ≥ p with the following property: If N |= I is a predense antichain above p, so I ∈ N then for some list p i : i < ω of I ∩ N we have ϕ 2 ( p i : i < ω ⌢ q ). We then say "q is explicitly (N, P)-generic above p."
In our proof K contains also the Levy collapse, so not only mild forcings. So as soon as the definition of the forcing P is sensitive to cardinals, Knep becomes a strong requirement. Think for example again of the forcing specialising a normal Aronszajn tree: After collapsing, the Aronszajn tree is just a perfect tree ⊆ ω <ω .
So finally to get (♥) we need even more than explicitly nep:
-definition of a forcing notion P is called straight nep if is it K-explicitly nep and in addition For ℓ < 3 the formula ϕ ℓ is of the form
where in the formula ψ P ℓ the quantifiers are of the form (∃s ′ ∈ s) and the atomic formulae are x ∈ y, "x is an ordinal", "x < y are ordinals" and those of B.
(2) We say very straight if it is straight and in addition (f ) for some Borel functions B 1 , B 2 , if N is a candidate andā lists N and p ∈ P N , then q = B 1 (p,ā, N ) is explicitly (N, P)-generic and B 2 (p,ā, N ) is a witness, that is it witnesses p ≤ q and ϕ 2 ( p I,n : n < ω , q) for some sequence p I,n : n < ω of members of I for every predense antichain I of P N in N .
The property from Definition 3.8(1) guarantees: If p, q ∈ M 1 and p ≤ q in V, then M 1 |= p ≤ q. Upwards absoluteness is included in the more basic canon of nep properties Definition 3.6 (a), (b).
The following lemma shows that there are many examples of forcing notions that meet our version non-elementary properness. Its proof is long and will not be repeated here.
Lemma 3.9. We can use ZFC * = ZC − which is K-good for K from Page 26 and normal.
(1) Suppose that P is a forcing of one of the following types:
(a) Q tree e (K, Σ) for some finitary tree creating pair (K, Σ) that is t-omittory without a condition on the norm for e = 0 and 2-big in the case of e = 1 (this covers Sacks forcing). 
]).
(2) Suppose that P is a forcing of one of the following types:
(a) Q tree e (K, Σ) for some countable tree creating pair (K, Σ) that is t-omittory without a condition on the norm (see Def. 2.15) for e = 0 and 2-big in the case of e = 1 (this Miller forcing and Laver forcing). for i < n there is t ∈ Σ(t 0 , . . . , t n−1 ) such that nor(t) ≥ max i<n nor(t i ). Then P is an explicitly nep very straight forcing notion. If N is a (φ, B, ZFC * )-candidate and for each n, x n ∈ ω ω is a Cohen real over N and p ∈ P N then there is q ∈ P, q ≥ p that is (N, P)-generic and q (∀n)(x n is a Cohen real over
For proper forcings that are given by a definition (φ, B, ZFC * ) this is a strengthening of Def. 3.1, since for countable M ≺ H(χ), the transitive collapse is a candidate.
So finally we can state the main theorem in this section:
Theorem 3.11. Suppose B is a model with domain |B| ⊆ H(ω 1 ) and countable signature, the definition (φ, B, ZFC * ) of P is explicitly very straightly nep, ZFC * is normal and K-good. Suppose that P is ω-Cohen preserving for (φ, B, ZFC * )-candidates. Then P is (T, Y, S)-preserving for all triples (T, Y, S).
Proof. Let λ ≥ 2 |H(ω 1 )| be large enough such that (∀λ ′ ≥ λ)(H(λ ′ ) |= ZFC * ). Let λ 1 = |H(λ)|, and let χ > λ 1 ≥ λ. Let N ′ ≺ H(χ) be countable such that {λ 1 , p, S, T,φ, B} ⊂ N ′ . Our aim is to show that N ′ is as in Def. 1.16. Let N be the Mostowski collapse of N ′ and say
Proof: R is a forcing notion in N and hence in V. Let g 1 be generic over V not just over N . We first show that g 1 would be as desired, were it in V. In
I is dense and open in the forcing π((T, < T )). By the forcing theorem there is p ∈ g 1 ∩ R such that N |= p R Ĩ is dense and open. Assume towards a contradiction that
The set
is dense and open in the Cohen poset, since R is just Cohen forcing, and the iteration of two Cohen forcings is equivalent to the iteration in the reversed order. So there is ν ∈ π N ′ (T < T t ) and there is q ≥ p such that q R ν ∈ I which is a contradiction. Now g 1 is not in V. The requirements on g 1 have only quantifiers bounded by sets and hence are absolute for transitive models
So "there is such a g with these properties" is a Σ 1 sentence with parameters in V that is true in V[g 1 ]. By absoluteness, it is true also in V. Let t ∈ Y ∩ π N ′ (T ) be given. Note that π N ′ (T ) = T <δ . By the assumption that T is (Y, S)-proper, and hence after the Levy collapse, π(
is also (M, π N ′ (T ))-generic by the choice of g. M is a candidate since P is nep as in the condition of the theorem and as R ∈ K. Now we use that P is ω-Cohen preserving for the (φ, B, ZFC * )-candidate M . We choose a dense embedding h :
) generic, and this holds also for extensions of M since there is the isomorphism h in them. Since π N ′ (T < T t ) is (M, π N ′ (T ))-generic, η t is Cohen generic over M . Now we use that P is Cohen preserving for the candidate M . So there is q ≥ π(p) that is (M, P)-generic and
and q is (M, P)-generic. Now we get from the latter
Why? We use nep again. We take χ 1 such that N |= (χ 1 is sufficiently large such that P(P) ∈ H(χ 1 ) and χ 1 is sufficiently small so that 2 χ 1 exists).
We claim: q 1 is as required in the first half of (3.2), that is: For any I ∈ M [G P ] that has a P-name in N and is (forced by the weakest condition to be) a dense set in π(T, < T ) in the sense of
All Ĩ ∈ N that are P-names for dense sets in π(T, < T ) have names Ĩ ∈ N 1 . Now we argue in N : For any q 2 ≥ q 1 , q 2 ∈ M , there is q ≥ q 2 , q is (M, P)-generic and q (∀t ∈ π(Y (δ)))(Ĩ ∩ π(T < T t ) = ∅), as we have shown above, in Equation (3.1), proved for q 1 instead of π(p) and proved in N |= ZFC * instead of in H(χ) and
that has a P-name in N and is a dense set in π N ′ (T, < T ), q 1 (∀t ∈ π(Y (δ)))(Ĩ ∩ π(T < T t ) = ∅). So q 1 has the property required of q 3 in (3.2). Now we use nep again and find q 3 ≥ q 1 that is (N, P)-generic. So q 3 witnesses that (3.2) is proved. Now after taking the reverse image of the Mostowski collapse (the nep forcing P is moved from model to model by just taking its interpretation) we have q 4 ≥ p such that
In the special case that the Y ∩T δ is a singleton (or empty) for all δ ∈ S, we need only a weaker form of Cohen preserving, with one Cohen generic η. In this special case "T is (Y, S)-proper" implies T ↾ {sup(a) : a ∈ S ∧ Y (sup(a)) = ∅} has no specialisation, see [22, Ch. IX] . We may also consider the well-known stronger variant of (Y, S)-properness for forcing with finite products of T : If N ≺ H(χ) and δ = N ∩ ω 1 and N ∩ ω 1 ∈ S and t 0 , . . . , t n−1 are pairwise distinct then {s ∈ n (T <δ ) : ℓ<n s ℓ < T t ℓ } is (( n (T <δ ), N )-generic. Also preserving this kind of (Y, S)-properness in a consequence of ω-Cohen-preserving and nep, by the same proof as above. By an analogue of the results of the next section, this preservation property is iterable. Proof (1): Assume N ≺ H(χ), N ∩ ω 1 ∈ S, N ∩ ω 1 = δ, and P ∈ N , p ∈ N ∩ P, and assume for every i < ω, x i be Cohen generic over N . Let x = st for a winning strategy st for player COM in 2 (N, P, p). We show that there is a q as required.
Let {Ĩ k : k ∈ ω} list all P-names in N of comeager sets and let {J n : n ∈ ω} list all the dense sets in P in N . Now take a play p n ,q n : n ∈ ω in which COM plays according to st. By Lemma 1.4 COM can strengthen his moves and still wins. COM plays in every round n in every part p n,ℓ , ℓ < ℓ n , so strong that p n,ℓ ∈ r<n J r such that for every i < n
Such p n,ℓ exist for the following reason: Since k<n Ĩ k is (forced by the weakest condition to be) comeagre, for every n ∈ ω, the set J n = {s ∈ C : {q ∈ P : q P [s] ∩ k<n Ĩ k = ∅} is dense and open in P} is open and dense in the Cohen forcing C in the ground model. The Cohen real x i fulfils x i ∈ J n . So for every i, {q ∈ P : q P x i ∈ k<n Ĩ k } is dense in P.
Now we unfreeze k and combine the equations (3.3) and (3.4) and thus get
From q n,i ∈ r<n J r we also get that q u is (N, P)-generic. ⊣ Remark 3.14. ω-Cohen preserving is not a necessary condition for preserving Souslin trees: By [23, Lemma 3.1], Blass-Shelah forcing is nep in the strong form that is used in Theorem 3.11. Blass-Shelah forcing is not Cohen preserving. This follows from the fact that the generic real is not split by any real in the ground model (see [3] 
Preserving the Souslinity of an ω 1 -tree
The topic of the section is the preservation of properties of notions of forcing in countable support iterations. We return to the ω 1 -trees and the properties of (T, Y, S) from the first section. In this section we give a selfcontained proof of the following theorem:
Theorem 4.1. Let P α , Q β : α ≤ γ, β < γ be a countable support iteration of proper forcings. Suppose that T is a Souslin tree in V and that for every α < γ, in V Pα , Qα "T is Souslin". Then T is Souslin in V Pγ . The proof of Theorem 4.2 is not more complex than the proof of Theorem 4.1. It involves preserving unbounded families in certain relations. A simple similar example is to preserve a ≤ * -unbounded family. The relations are binary relations on spaces a a for countable sets a. For the proof of Theorem 4.2 we need that the union of all considered a covers ω 1 . For each fixed a, a a is just a copy of the Baire space ω ω , which means a has the discrete topology and a a carries the product topology. We consider ℵ 1 different sets a, and on each fixed a we work with countably many relations R α,a , α ∈ a.
By Lemma 1.15 T is Souslin in V
Let S ⊆ [ω 1 ] ω . Let for a ∈ S, g a ∈ a a and for α ∈ a, R α,a ⊆ a a × a a be a relation.
We assume that a fixed g a , the sets
are closed in a a. We will see that open relations do not harm since they are the union of countably many closed relations. Let N ≺ (H(χ), ∈, <). Now suppose that we have a collection G of g a 's such that
Is there a (N, P, p)-generic condition such that q forces that q forces (4.2) holds for f ∈ N [G]? Suppose the answer is positive for each iterand, what can be said about the countable support limit?
The proof of the iteration theorem in its basic form uses only that {f ∈ a a : f R α,a g a } is closed for each R α,a , g a . There is an example of relations R α,a , g a , such that (R, S,ḡ) preserving coincides with (T, S, Y )-preserving. The reader can jump ahead to Definition 4.9 to see what particular a, g a and R α,a we use for the proof of Theorem 4.2. We let
We point to the sources in [22] In our presentation in contrast to [6, 2] ,R is of size ω 1 and α( * ) = ω 1 . The widely known presentations of iteration theorems for the relations on the real numbers [6, 2] have usually countably many relations and the equivalent to α( * ) is ω. The relations we preserve are still on the Baire space and its topology matters for all the considered possibilities. However, there is for each a ∈ S an incarnation a a of the Baire space. Moreover, since a = N ∈ N names f ∈ N for functions f : dom(f ) → ω 1 such that a ⊆ dom(f ), f (x) ∈ a for x ∈ a now necessarily are names for functions with larger domains. This does not cause problems, since the evaluation will be always on a.
Note that we change one Definition, namely [22, Ch. XVIII, Def. 3.4]. So our version of "(R, S, g)-preserving for Possibility A" has not been named in the definitions in the book nor anywhere else. Namely items (iv) and (vi) of Def. 4.5 are new.
However, this Def. 4.5 is the one used in the proof of the preservation theorem for the limit case in [22, Ch. XVIII, Theorem 3.6]. Our Possibility A here and the proofs here (which are the ones from the book with some additional explanations) do not need the distinction whether reals are added or not. The original definition of Possibility A in the book works as well, however, the proofs are longer. There are two proofs based on the old definition: For forcings that add reals the technique is much shorter ( [6] ) than for the general case that was proved later by Goldstern and Kellner [7] . Our proof given here is short and works in the general case.
The letter Q now stands for an iterand. We let (2 |Q| ) + < χ, S ⊆ [ω 1 ] <ω 1 be stationary, usually the elements of S are of the form N ∩ω 1 for a countable N ≺ H(χ). In the language of [22] , we have for a ∈ S, d We will not mention the functions c, d, c ′ , d ′ henceforth since they are fixed. We stay with our special case of S and α( * ) = ω 1 . So we cut down a lot in comparison to the rich Section 3 of Chapter XVIII of [22] . On the other hand, we add numerous proofs to claims that are written there without a proof. Definition 4.3. (0) N is (R, S, g)-good means: a := N ∩ S ∈ S, and for every f ∈ N , f : S ⊃→ S with a ⊆ dom(f ) for some β ∈ a ∩ α( * ) we have f ↾ aR β,a g a .
(1) We say (R, S, g) covers in V iff for sufficiently large χ for every x ∈ H(χ) V there is a countable N ≺ H(χ) to which (R, S, g) and x belong such that N is (R, S, g)-good.
(2) Let S be stationary. We say (R, S, g) fully covers in V iff for some x ∈ H(χ), for every countable N ≺ H(χ) to which (R, S, g) and x belong and which fulfils N ∩ S ∈ S we have that N is (R, S, g)-good.
Definition 4.4.
(1) We say (R, S, g) strongly covers in Case A iff it covers in V and each R α,a is a closed or an open binary relation on a a. We assume from now on that for α ∈ a, a ∈ S, {f : a → a : f R α,a g a } is closed. This is sufficient.
(2) We say (R, S, g) strongly covers in Case C iff it covers in V and in addition for each a ∈ S in any forcing extension (or at least for any forcing extension in by a forcing in a family of forcings we are interested in) of V player II has a winning strategy in the following game: In the n-th move player I chooses N n , H n such that (a) (N n , ∈↾ N n ) is a countable not necessarily transitive model of
. . , f n−1 for each ℓ the functions f ℓ , f n ℓ are compatible} completes the induction step. In the end player II wins if for every m < ω, n≥m f n m is a function with domain a and α∈a m≥n f n m R α,a g a If R α,a is open then we can write R α,a = n∈ω R α,n,a where each R α,n,a is closed and use ω 1 = α( * ) = ωα( * ), R ′ ωα+n,a = R α,n,a and work with the closed relations R ′ β,n , β < α( * ). As we already mentioned, we changed the following definition in Possibility A in comparison to the definition [22, Ch. XVIII, Def. 3.4] in the book, so that it is fitting to the proof in the book. The items (iv) and (vi) are changed.
Definition 4.5. We say Q is (R, S, g)-preserving for Possibility A iff the following holds for any χ, χ 1 , N , p ∈ Q ∩ N , k < ω: Assume ( * ) (i) χ 1 is large enough and χ > 2 χ 1 ,
(iv) k ∈ ω and for ℓ < k we have a Q-name for a function f ℓ ∈ N , and
≤ β m ℓ , and β * ℓ = lim m→ω β m ℓ , (ix) if I is a dense open set of Q and I ∈ N , then for some n, p n ∈ I. Then there is q ≥ p, q ∈ Q that is (N, Q)-generic and (a) for
Note that conclusion (a) expresses a sort of directedness: g a is the same for any f ℓ , ℓ < k. We will use the possibility to work with unboundedly many k in the proof of the preservation of "(R, S, g)-preserving for Possibility A" for iterations when the cofinality of the iteration length is countable. Definition 4.6. We say Q is (R, S, g)-preserving for Possibility C iff the following holds: Assume (i) χ 1 is large enough and χ > 2 χ 1 ,
Lemma 4.7. 1) If (R, S, g) covers in V and Q is an (R, S, g)-preserving forcing notion (for any Possibility) then in V Q , (R, S, g) still covers.
2) The property "(R, S, g)-preserving for Possibility A (respectively C)" is preserved by composition of forcing notions. 
as in ( * ) of Definition 4.5 Possibility A. We take p 0 = p. By condition (vi) of ( * ) for each n < m < ω, q m 0 Q 0 q 0 1 ≤ Q 1 q n 1 ≤ Q 1 q m 1 hence without loss of generality by clause (ix) of ( * ) by taking different names q n 1 that are above q n 0 the same, ( * ) 1 Q 0 q 0 1 ≤ Q 1 q n 1 ≤ Q 1 q m 1 , and ( * ) 2 for every x ∈ a or every sufficiently large n < ω, (∅, q n 1 ) forces f l (x) to be equal to some specific Q 0 -name f ′ n,ℓ (x) ∈ N for each ℓ < k.
Since Q 0 is (R, S, g) preserving there is q 0 ∈ Q 0 which is (N, Q 0 )-generic and is above q 0 0 in Q 0 and forces N [G Q 0 ] to be (R, S, g)-good and for some γ ′ * ℓ ≤ β * ℓ , we have q 0 Q 0 ℓ<k f l R γ ′ ℓ ,a g a . Let G 0 ⊆ Q 0 be generic over V and q 0 ∈ G 0 . We want to apply Def- 
The following theorem is central.
Theorem 4.8. Suppose that (R, S, g) strongly covers in V for Possibility A (resp. C), and that P = P i , Q j : i ≤ α, j < α is a countable support iteration of proper (R, S, g)-preserving forcing notions for Possibility A (resp. C). Then P α is a (R, S, g)-preserving forcing notion for Possibility A (resp. C) and (R, S, g) strongly covers in V P for the respective Possibility.
Proof. We prove by induction of ζ ≤ α that for every ξ ≤ ζ, P ζ /P ξ is (R, S, g)-preserving for Possibility A (resp. C) in V P ξ , moreover in Definition 4.5 we can get dom(q) ξ = ζ ∩ N . For ζ = 0 there is nothing to prove, for ζ successor we use the previous lemma. So let ζ be a limit. We first consider cf(ζ) = ω. We fix a strictly increasing sequence ζ ℓ : ℓ < ω with ζ 0 = ξ and sup ζ ℓ = ζ. First we consider Possibility A. We let {τ j : j ∈ ω} list the P ζ -names of ordinals which belong to N . Let N be (R, S, g)-good. In the following we use the convention that the first index indicates that we deal with a P ζ ℓ -name τ or f (for a P ζ /P ζ ℓ -name) and the second index is for the enumeration of the particular subset of N .
We choose by induction on j, k j < ω such that (A) k j < k j+1 , (B) there is a sequence τ ℓ,j : ℓ < j such that τ ℓ,j is a P ζ ℓ -name and (α) p k j ↾ [ζ j , ζ) P ζ τ j = τ j,j , (β) for ℓ < j we have p k j ↾ [ζ ℓ , ζ ℓ+1 ) P ζ ℓ+1 τ ℓ+1,j = τ ℓ,j , (C) if j = i + 1, ℓ < i then P ζ ℓ+1
Given k i , τ ℓ,i : ℓ < i we by induction hypothesis the p that fulfil the requirement for p k i+1 are dense in Q ∩ N , hence by (ix) there is a k i+1 such that p k i+1 is in that dense set. Now let f l , ℓ < k, be given as in ( * ) of Def. 4.5. Let {f j : ℓ < j < ω} list the P ζ -names of members on N that are extensions of functions from a to a. For ℓ < k let them be the f * m,ℓ as given in ( * ) of Definition 4.5. Since N is (R, S, g)-good, p n from above can serve as p n in ( * ). We will now show how to choose f * m,j ∈ N , m < ω, j < ω. Let h(j, x) < ω be such that τ h(j,x) = f j (x). We can now define for n < ω, j < ω, f * n,j a P ζn -name of a function from a to a. Let f * n,j (x) = τ n,h(j,x) if h(j, x) ≥ n and τ h(j,x),h(j,x) if h(j, x) < n. So f * 0,j (x) = f j (x) for j < k. So also for the names f * m,j (x) we have (viii) of the hypothesis ( * ), since (viii) holds objects f m,j from there and the sets {f ∈ a a : f R β,a g a } are closed for β ∈ a. We choose by induction on n, q n , α n l for ℓ < k + n such that (a) q n ∈ P ζn , dom(q n ) ξ = N ∩ ζ n , q n+1 ↾ ζ n = q n , (b) q n is (N, P ζn )-generic, (c) q n P ζn N [G P ζn ] is (R, S, g)-good, (d) p 0 ↾ ζ 0 ≤ q 0 in P ζ 0 , (e) q n+1 ↾ ζ n P ζn p n ↾ [ζ n , ζ n+1 ) ≤ p n+1 ↾ [ζ n , ζ n+1 ) (in P ζ n+1 /P ζn ), (f) for ℓ < k + n, α n l is a P ζn -name of an ordinal in a, q n+1 α n+1 ℓ˜≤ α n l , α 0 ℓ ≤ β * ℓ , for ℓ < k, (g) for ℓ < k + n, q n P ζn f * n,l R α n l ,a g a . The induction step is by the induction hypothesis and by Definition 4.5 Possibility A with k + n in the role of k. In the end we let q = n<ω q n .
We show that q is (N, P ζ )-generic and that is satisfies conclusions (a) and (b) of Def. 4.5. Let q ∈ G P ζ ⊆ P ζ , G P ζ be P ζ -generic over V. G P ξ = G P ζ ∩P ξ for ξ < ζ and G P ζn = G P ζ ∩P ζn . Now for each P ζ -name τ for an ordinal there is some j such that τ = τ j . q j forces τ j,j ∈ N and p j ↾ [ζ j , ζ) forces τ j = τ j,j . p j ↾ [ζ j , ζ) ≤ q by (d) and (e). So q forces τ j = τ j,j and q τ j ∈ N ∩ On, so q is (N, P ζ )-generic.
For each ℓ, α n ℓ : ℓ ≤ n < ω is not increasing by (f) and hence eventually constant, say with value α * ℓ . If x ∈ a, j < ω, then for n > h(j, x), p n f j (x) = f * n,j (x). So for every finite b ⊆ a, (f * n,j ↾ b)[G P ζn ] : n < ω is eventually constant, equal to (f j ↾ b)[G P ζ ]. By (g), for sufficiently large n, Proof. For the forward direction we read the meaning of (R, S, g). It is easy to fulfil ( * ) of Definition 4.5 for k = 0. Conclusion (b) in Definition 4.5 for Possibility A ensures that Q is (T, S, Y )-preserving.
For the backward direction: We look at Possibility A. All the {f : f R α,a g a } are open or closed, and by reorganising, we can assume that all of them are closed. Fix k ∈ ω and p, f l , ℓ < k, f * m,ℓ , ℓ, m < ω, β m ℓ , m < ω, p n : n < ω as in ( * ) of Def. 4.5. We have to find a particular generic q ≥ p that also satisfies conclusions (a) and (b) of Def. 4.5. Now I = {q ∈ Q ∩ N : q (∃ℓ < k)(¬f l R β * ℓ ,a g a )} is dense above some p n in P since ℓ<k {f ∈ a a : ¬f R β * ℓ ,a g a } is open in the Baire space a a. So first we take p 1 ≥ p, p 1 ∈ I ∩ N , and then we take, according to preserving in possibility C, q ≥ p 1 such that q is (N, P)-generic and q N [G Q ] is (R, S, g)-good.
⊣ So now for the proof of Theorem 4.2 we can use Lemma 4.6 and Theorem 4.8 for Possibility A or for Possibility C, and we are done.
